University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research
Electronic Journal

College of Arts and Sciences

5-7-2015

All Work and No Pay: How Labor Force Demographics Explain
Regional Variation in the Arab Spring Uprisings
Elana M. Stern
University of Pennsylvania, selana@sas.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej
Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Stern, Elana M., "All Work and No Pay: How Labor Force Demographics Explain Regional
Variation in the Arab Spring Uprisings" 07 May 2015. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research
Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/192.

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/192
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

All Work and No Pay: How Labor Force Demographics Explain Regional Variation
in the Arab Spring Uprisings
Abstract
Despite scholarly and popular hopes and predictions that the 2011 Arab Spring would mean the end of
authoritarianism and the onset of democracy across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,
anti-regime uprisings only occurred in a small subset of MENA nations. This thesis aims to address the
puzzle of the Arab Spring’s partial contagion; the main interest of this work is to explore why the six Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in particular escaped the Arab Spring virtually unscathed. The
hypothesis offered here argues that the regional variation in the Arab Spring uprisings can be explained by
labor force demographics in the GCC. Dominated by non-Arab, Asian migrant laborers, GCC workforces
depend on the exploitative kafala sponsorship system that ties migrant workers to Gulf employers in a
mode of quasi-indentured servitude. The kafala system and the labor force demographics it has created
in the GCC are significant to the Arab Spring uprisings in two ways: first, migrant workers strike and
protest their living and working conditions often, and suffer harsh consequences as a result. Gulf migrant
workers’ collective action and the punishments that they endure operated as a mode of demonstration
effect that deterred Gulf citizens from engaging in similar behavior against their respective governments.
Second, Asian migrant workers recruited through the kafala system have supplanted intraregional labor
imports from poorer MENA nations such as Egypt and Tunisia; the preference of GCC employers for Asian
migrant workers has meant increases in unemployment in non-GCC MENA countries, which contributed
to the mass discontentment and lack of upward social mobility that resulted in upheaval in these nations
and some others, including Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The economic preconditions of Gulf countries –
major oil and construction industries, high GDP, and low domestic unemployment – allow for the kafala
system to exist. Unlike existing explanations for regional variation during the Arab Spring uprisings,
including hereditary succession, the use of social media, cultural diversity and oil wealth, the
demographic makeup of countries’ labor forces consistently separates GCC nations from those that
experienced mass uprising and unrest. This thesis marshals quantitative evidence and a selection of case
studies of specific countries – Libya, Bahrain, and Qatar – to demonstrate why labor force demographics
matter to political behavior and outcomes in the context of the Arab Spring. Ultimately, the exigencies of
the GCC labor markets make complete, meaningful, or sustained transition away from authoritarianism
toward democracy unlikely in the entirety of the MENA region in the foreseeable future.
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Abstract
Despite scholarly and popular hopes and predictions that the 2011 Arab Spring would
mean the end of authoritarianism and the onset of democracy across the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region, anti-regime uprisings only occurred in a small subset of MENA nations.
This thesis aims to address the puzzle of the Arab Spring’s partial contagion; the main interest of
this work is to explore why the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in particular
escaped the Arab Spring virtually unscathed. The hypothesis offered here argues that the regional
variation in the Arab Spring uprisings can be explained by labor force demographics in the GCC.
Dominated by non-Arab, Asian migrant laborers, GCC workforces depend on the exploitative
kafala sponsorship system that ties migrant workers to Gulf employers in a mode of quasiindentured servitude. The kafala system and the labor force demographics it has created in the
GCC are significant to the Arab Spring uprisings in two ways: first, migrant workers strike and
protest their living and working conditions often, and suffer harsh consequences as a result. Gulf
migrant workers’ collective action and the punishments that they endure operated as a mode of
demonstration effect that deterred Gulf citizens from engaging in similar behavior against their
respective governments. Second, Asian migrant workers recruited through the kafala system
have supplanted intraregional labor imports from poorer MENA nations such as Egypt and
Tunisia; the preference of GCC employers for Asian migrant workers has meant increases in
unemployment in non-GCC MENA countries, which contributed to the mass discontentment and
lack of upward social mobility that resulted in upheaval in these nations and some others,
including Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The economic preconditions of Gulf countries – major oil
and construction industries, high GDP, and low domestic unemployment – allow for the kafala
system to exist. Unlike existing explanations for regional variation during the Arab Spring
uprisings, including hereditary succession, the use of social media, cultural diversity and oil
wealth, the demographic makeup of countries’ labor forces consistently separates GCC nations
from those that experienced mass uprising and unrest. This thesis marshals quantitative evidence
and a selection of case studies of specific countries – Libya, Bahrain, and Qatar – to demonstrate
why labor force demographics matter to political behavior and outcomes in the context of the
Arab Spring. Ultimately, the exigencies of the GCC labor markets make complete, meaningful,
or sustained transition away from authoritarianism toward democracy unlikely in the entirety of
the MENA region in the foreseeable future.
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Stern 1
Chapter I: The Puzzle
Introduction
The self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010
began a seemingly contagious regional mass social movement for political and socioeconomic
change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Bouazizi, an unlicensed fruit peddler in
Tunisia, doused himself in gasoline in response to “just one of the thousands of petty indignities
Tunisians had been forced to swallow their whole lives;” this act “set in motion the region’s most
tumultuous change for more than half a century.”1 Upheaval spread from Tunisia to Egypt,
Libya, Yemen and Syria, unseating dictators and plunging countries into protracted civil conflict.
Countries including Jordan, Algeria, Oman and Bahrain also experienced some milder antigovernment protests, but these demonstrations did not result in total upheaval or regime collapse.
This regional tumult, born of demands for more representative government and better economic
opportunities for upward social mobility,2 was termed the “Arab Spring.”3
The driving force behind the Arab Spring was mass discontentment with political and
socioeconomic status quos. Historically, the MENA region has been dominated by oppressive
non-democratic governments; modern authoritarian regimes remain largely concentrated in the
MENA region, and these governments have survived without democracy threatening to gain a
serious foothold until growing youth populations began to demand more dignified livelihoods
and more job opportunities in 2011.4 According to the United Nations, people aged 15-24
(“youth”) are a dominant age bracket in the MENA region, and unemployment among youth in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring (New York: Bloomsbury
Press, 2013), 42.
2
Danahar, The New Middle East, 6.
3
Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor, "Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution?
Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, no.
2 (Spring 2012): 167, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41495309.
4
Danahar, The New Middle East, 6.
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MENA is the highest of any world region.5 Frustrated with little or no potential for upward social
mobility due to a general lack of employment opportunities, youth in MENA nations “[became]
the force behind the historical uprisings in the region, demanding change.”6 Youth led charges
against “‘unpopular repressive leader[s]’” in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen,
overthrowing autocrats in the first three of those nations and igniting a prolonged civil war in
Syria.
Yet, despite scholarly and popular predictions that the contagion of protest would
eventually reach every MENA regime, effectively spelling the end of authoritarianism and the
onset of meaningful, sustainable democratic development across the region, this did not become
a reality.7 Even in countries where mass protest and violent upheaval took place, calls for
political liberalization have failed to manifest as democracy.8 While protests in Tunisia, Egypt
and Libya successfully unseated existing governments, well-functioning, thriving democracies
have not yet materialized; authoritarian collapse on its own “is not a sufficient condition for such
[democratic] transition.”9
Perhaps even more interestingly, several prominent authoritarian regimes not only
survived, but experienced virtually no popular anti-government uprising. As Eva Bellin notes,
“The limited geographical reach of the Arab Spring is one of the most important observations to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

Farzaneh Roudi, Youth Population and Employment in the Middle East and North Africa:
Opportunity or Challenge? (New York: The United Nations, 2011), accessed January 15, 2015,
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/p06_roudi.pdf.
6
Farzaneh Roudi, Youth Population and Employment in the Middle East and North Africa.
7
Shadi Hamid, Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, in Danahar, The New Middle East, 2829.
8
"The Arab World: Tethered by History," The Economist, July 5, 2014, accessed December 10,
2014, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21606286-failures-arab-spring-were-long-time-makingtethered-history.
9
Eva Bellin, "A Modest Transformation: Political Change in the Arab World after the 'Arab
Spring,'" in The Arab Spring: Will it Lead to Democratic Transitions?, ed. Clement Henry and Jang JiHyang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 37.
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make…While every country in the region had citizens receptive to the contagion of the
‘awakening,’ in fact, the vast majority of Arab countries successfully avoided the mass
mobilization of protest.”10 In particular, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations – Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – are a specific
collection of states – united by geographic proximity and economic practices and interests – in
the region that escaped the Arab Spring virtually unscathed. However, GCC countries have much
in common with countries such as Egypt and Libya, which were overwhelmed by mass
mobilization and anti-regime uprisings; all had authoritarian, non-democratic governments, and
the GCC member countries and Libya are all oil-rich states. The goal of this thesis is to address
this puzzle: Why did the Arab Spring unevenly affect the MENA region? Why did some of these
authoritarian states experience violent government overthrow, chaos, and prolonged civil war
while others remained virtually unaffected by the “contagion” of the Arab Spring – essentially,
what explains the “partial contagion” that appears to have occurred?
This thesis hypothesizes that the answer to this puzzle lies in labor force demographics.
All of the six GCC countries have sizable non-Arab, Asian migrant worker populations; this is an
economic variable common to all six GCC nations that, unlike oil, is not also present in countries
that experienced uprising and overthrow (e.g. Libya). On the whole, these nations did not
undergo appreciable unrest or massive anti-government social movements, and all of them rely
heavily on exploiting cheap and reliable South Asian migrant labor on major scales. All of these
nations, unlike MENA countries that underwent substantial anti-government uprising, and in
some cases, regime overthrow, employ non-Arab migrant workers in construction and industrial

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

Eva Bellin, "A Modest Transformation: Political Change in the Arab World after the 'Arab
Spring,'" 35.
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development-related projects. Essentially, the GCC labor force dominated by non-Arab, mostly
South Asian migrant workers, is largely responsible for these nations’ relative lack of uprising.11
As this paper will explain, these foreign workers’ employment in such huge numbers
helps to explain variation in unrest during the Arab Spring via several interrelated causal
mechanisms: first, the combination of low domestic unemployment and workforces dominated
by foreign labor in the GCC indicates certain fiscal preconditions that both attract and sustain
massive migrant populations, and levels of fiscal stability that diminish discontent (e.g.
employment opportunities are not lacking relative to other MENA nations with much higher
domestic unemployment rates and negligible or zero migrant worker populations). Second, these
migrant workers strike, in direct contravention of anti-union statutes in GCC countries, and are
often punished – imprisoned, threatened with violence, and/or deported – for their collective
action.12 By way of demonstration effect, migrant laborers’ strikes and the ensuing consequences
effectively diminished the likelihood of GCC citizens taking up similar behavior against their
respective governments.

Research Methodology
This thesis adopts a qualitative and quantitative data-driven approach to explore and
assess several arguments concerning the patterns of Arab Spring uprisings across the region.
First, the theory of protest diffusion will be discussed to explore why the Arab Spring spread to a
select few MENA nations while others completely avoided protest. The following section will
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

Andrzej Kapiszewski, Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries, Beirut:
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, 2006, 3, accessed April 27,
2014, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/expert/11/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf
12
Dan McDougal, "Tourists Targeted as Dubai Workers Stage Revolt: 'Exploited' Migrant
Labourers Take Their Protest to the Luxury Malls They Built," The Guardian Weekly (Dubai), April 14,
2006, accessed December 10, 2014, LexisNexis Academic.
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review existing hypotheses in the relevant literature that aims to explain variation in the Arab
Spring. Next, the labor force demographics hypothesis will be presented, and data on labor force
demographics in the GCC nations, in conjunction with other fiscal health indicators, including
unemployment rates collected from the World Bank, will be offered in support of this theory. In
addition to fiscal indicators and labor force demographics, analysis of data gathered from the
Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) on labor-related and anti-government
protests in the GCC and other selected MENA nations further supports the hypothesis that
protests did not diffuse to the GCC in any sustained or meaningful way due to the demonstration
effect of migrant labor uprisings. This data supports the contention that both the demonstration
effect and preexisting economic conditions that attracted non-Arab migrant workers to the GCC
meaningfully explain political variation across the MENA region during the Arab Spring.
After the literature and data are reviewed and analyzed, this thesis presents three case
studies of countries with varying experiences of the Arab Spring. These nations – Libya,
Bahrain, and Qatar – were selected because each demonstrates useful variation in the
independent and dependent variables of interest. The quantitative data marshaled here has its
limitations, and therefore case studies are useful to draw out the analysis. Libya is used to
address the failure of existing hypotheses and explanations for why certain regimes collapsed
and others remained unharmed during the course of the Arab Spring. Libya correlates with the
Gulf nations in terms of several independent variables, such as oil wealth, but Libya is missing a
non-Arab migrant labor force. Bahrain is profiled in anticipation of potential criticism of the
hypothesis advanced in this thesis. Bahrain could be read as an exception to the general theory
that this paper argues explains regional variation in the Arab Spring uprisings because Bahrain
experienced some collective organization against the government, but protests were quickly put
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down with the help of the Saudi Arabian government.13 The exceptional aspects of the Bahraini
case will be explored to show that the experience of this one country, while it departs from the
GCC on the whole, does not undermine the overarching hypothesis presented in this thesis.
Finally, Qatar is the positive case that illustrates how labor force demographics influenced
political activity and outcomes in the MENA region during the Arab Spring. Qatar has an
overwhelming Asian migrant labor force and experienced no mass protest during the Arab
Spring. The final section of this thesis concludes and discusses implications of this work.

Chapter II: Theoretical Approaches to Protest Diffusion
“Rebellion is a very complicated matter that cannot be reduced to a few variables.”14
Overview
Mohammed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation symbolized the desperation of people
throughout the MENA region; the very public and publicized death of a poor Tunisian fruit
vendor in turn led to a much broader, long-term “fight against corrupt regimes, unemployment
and inflation.”15 First in Tunisia and then in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, autocrats faced
credible threats and regimes collapsed under pressure from populations that no longer remained
silent in the face of social, political and economic repression. In the space of one year, several

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

Ahmed Kanna, "A Politics of Non-Recognition? Biopolitics of Arab Gulf Worker Protests in
the Year of Uprisings," Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 4, no. 1 (May 2012): 152,
accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/Interface-4-1-Kanna.pdf; "Bahrain Profile," BBC News, September 19,
2013, accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14540571.
14
Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 79.
15
Mohamed A.J. Althani, The Arab Spring and the Gulf States: Time to Embrace
Change (London: Profile Books, 2012), 69.
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leaders were overthrown and in Syria, a civil war had begun in the name of liberalization and
reform.
On the whole, mass mobilization and anti-regime protests during the Arab Spring can be
explained by general fatigue with autocratic governments; the countries that experienced major
unrest and regime collapse were similar in “their aging leaders and corrupt and ineffectual
governments [and] their educated, unemployed and disaffected youth.”16 After Bouazizi’s death,
protests began in Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s Tunisia, where the government “tightly restricted
free expression and political parties.”17 Labor strikes by disenchanted and desperate Tunisians
“fueled protests;” the “unusually personalist and predatory” nature of Ben Ali’s corruption was
no longer sustainable, and Ben Ali fled the country amidst the growing unrest.18 In Tunisia, the
military’s ironic inaction also played an important role; the military’s “refusal to support Ben Ali
contributed to the country’s revolution.”19
A similar dynamic occurred in Egypt: the military “sided with the protesters” and helped
to oust Hosni Mubarak’s long-standing regime.20 The spread of anti-regime fervor from Tunisia
to Egypt can be explained partly by demonstration effect and by cultural and socioeconomic
similarities: in both countries, an under- and unemployed youth population grew desperate. Just
as labor protests grew into politicized anti-regime movements in Tunisia, in Egypt, “the
government’s deteriorating ability to provide basic services and seeming indifference to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 3, accessed February 8, 2015,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23039401.
17
Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 3.
18
Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 3-4.
19
Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 3.
20
F. Gregory Gause, III, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of
Authoritarian Stability," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011): 84, accessed December 15, 2014,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora90&div=67&id=&page=.
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widespread unemployment and poverty alienated tens of millions of Egyptians.”21 Egypt’s
“bulging” youth population with little or no opportunity for upward social mobility and
seemingly zero employment prospects drove them to the streets.22 As a former labor-exporting
country to the GCC, the “deliberate reduction by the GCC of workers from the Arab region and
growing preference for South Asian workers” directly affected Egyptian youth searching for
employment.23 The ramifications of this shift in labor preference and subsequent labor force
demographics in the GCC, and their explanatory power regarding the Arab Spring, are discussed
in a later section.
Protests and regime collapse in Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, discussed in more detail in
the case study portion of this thesis, were similar to Egypt and Tunisia in their ousting of a longstanding, corrupt autocrat, by demanding “jobs, services, and an end to the mafia-like state that
had terrorized and humiliated [Libyans] for decades.”24 However, what differed in Libya was the
role played by “cleavages of kinship and region.”25 This is significant because the military in
Libya splintered in the face of protest; some units remained loyal to the Gaddafi family, while
others “defected to the opposition, stayed on the sidelines, or just [went] home.”26 The loss of
control over the military meant that preempting and putting down protests when they erupted
became increasingly difficult for the civilian regime.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 4.
Barry Mirkin, Arab Spring: Demographics in a Region in Transition, Arab Human
Development Report (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2013), 10, accessed April 27,
2014, http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdrps/AHDR%20ENG%20Arab%20Spring%
20Mirkinv3.pdf.
23
Mirkin, Arab Spring: Demographics in a Region in Transition, 17.
24
Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2012), 2.
25
Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 6.
26
Gause, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring,” 84.
22
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Libyans distrusted not only their tyrannical government, but one another, leading to a
protracted civil war: “The revolution in Libya was unique among those of the Arab Spring
because it was absolute.”27 Protests that, as in Tunisia and Egypt, began as nonviolent
demonstrations, escalated after Gaddafi “launched a brutal crackdown” against his own people.28
This led to an all-out, violent civil war that spelled the implosion of the Libyan regime and civil
society. Eventually, NATO involvement and intervention, a decision justified by humanitarian
intentions, “enabled the Libyan opposition to overthrow one of the world's longest-ruling
dictators.”29
Why the Arab Spring occurred when and where it did has preoccupied many scholars.
As a region, MENA has perhaps the last remaining geographic concentration of authoritarian
governments of varying degrees and kinds in the 21st century; with the exceptions of Israel and
Turkey, all MENA nations successfully resisted, until, it appeared, the onset of the Arab Spring,
the waves of democratization that swept the globe.30 The cultural, economic, and ethnic
homogeneity of these nations has been offered as an explanation for both the staying power and
the vulnerability of the regimes that remained virtually undisturbed until mass protests threatened
to, and in some cases, actually did, unseat autocrats. That this reasoning has been employed to
explain both regime resilience and collapse underlines its analytical weakness and thus, its
inadequacy.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Danahar, The New Middle East, 326-27, emphases in original.
Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya," Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2012, accessed February 8, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-hdaalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya.
29
Ibid.
30
Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Spring
1991): 13, accessed February 8, 2015,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v002/2.2huntington.pdf.
28
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As the map below illustrates, the geographic proximity of and political, social and
economic similarities among these countries helps to explain the spread of protests from Tunisia
to Egypt and Libya, and eventually to Yemen and Syria. The notion of “cross-border Arab
identity…a sense of common political identity despite living in 20 different states” has been
offered to explain the rise and spread of anti-government protests across the MENA region
during the Arab Spring.31 The problem with this argument is twofold: first, a shared Arab
identity arguably extends beyond the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria and to
countries that experienced little or no uprising, and second, similar to many existing hypotheses,
it explains what did happen, but fails to consider what did not. That is a primary goal of this
thesis.

Figure 1: Map of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
Source: http://www.worldmonitor.info/regions/graphics/maps/MENA.png.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Gause, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring,” 87-88.
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Theoretical Underpinnings
The Arab Spring left scholars and the public alike with two puzzles. First, the fact that the
Arab Spring occurred at all was puzzling, but that the contagion of revolution was incomplete at
best, affecting a select few nations – and therefore failing to infect the entire region – was also
unexpected. Literature on the Arab Spring notes that “observers imagined mass uprisings
spreading rapidly across national boundaries to replace dictator after dictator with new leaders
proclaiming a dawning era of democracy and freedom.”32 Why anti-government protests only
occurred in a handful of MENA nations, and why the unrest missed some nations entirely,
requires further explanation. It is first important to understand why the Arab Spring occurred
when it did and why and how protest diffused to certain countries to understand regional
variation in the Arab Spring uprisings. The theories of “regime change cascades” and collective
action diffusion are useful to consider in this context.33
According to Hale, a regime change cascade “implies that earlier events in one country
(the crossing of certain thresholds) tend to trigger or otherwise facilitate later ones in other
countries.”34 The events of the Arab Spring seem to illustrate a manifestation of regional regime
change cascade. Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the mass uprisings that followed in Tunisia set
similar collective action in motion in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Essentially, the events in
Tunisia fueled and even accelerated the uprisings that later took place and toppled some other
governments in the region;35 the symbolism of Bouazizi’s very public, gruesome death and the
mass movement that followed “serve[d] as a powerful reality-simplifying heuristic that…
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32

Henry E. Hale, "Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions
to the 2011 Arab Uprisings," Annual Review of Political Science16 (February 28, 2013): 332, accessed
February 2, 2015, doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212204.
33
Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 332.
34
Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 333.
35
Ibid.
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evoke[d] powerful emotions that prompt[ed] coordinated action.”36 By the logic of the
demonstration effect, Bouazizi’s death and the uprisings that followed in Tunisia “triggered a
major protest wave in Egypt;” the end of the Mubarak regime then fueled similar behavior by
other anti-government, pro-liberation movements in Libya, Syria and Yemen.37 While this
demonstration effect theory of regime change cascade helps to explain why protest diffused from
Tunisia to other MENA nations, it also poses at least two more questions: why do individuals
decide to participate in such mass movements, and why did certain countries and not others
become “infected” with the contagion of anti-government protest?
Models of “collective behavior” – an umbrella term that includes protests and riots – help
to explain why individuals engage in group action.38 The threshold level model of individual
choice is useful for understanding the Arab Spring protests. According to Granovetter’s
“‘threshold’ model of collective behavior,” individuals choose between action and inaction (in
this case, whether or not to join an anti-government protest) based on when “the actual
percentage of already active people starts to dominate her or his threshold level.”39 This means
that individuals choose whether or not to engage in a certain behavior based on their own costbenefit analysis of joining others already engaged in that behavior. An individual’s threshold
level is “the proportion of active others at which [the individual’s] net benefit of action (total
benefit minus total cost) first becomes positive… the threshold approach can be interpreted as a
rational choice model.”40 Every individual actor’s threshold level is different and unique to them;
for some people, taking part in a mass movement in its early stages before thousands of others
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 336.
Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 337.
38
Norman Braun, "Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion," Rationality and Society 7, no. 2
(April 1995): 167, accessed February 2, 2015, doi:10.1177/1043463195007002005.
39
Braun, “Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion,” 167-68.
40
Braun, “Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion,” 171.
37

Stern 13
have joined may be more or less costly. Some individuals may prefer to be leaders of a
movement and thus join earlier in the movement’s development, and therefore calculate that they
have less to lose by engaging in this behavior at this stage. Others, however, may calculate that
only once hundreds or thousands of people are already protesting that their benefits outweigh
potential costs of joining an existing movement.
Thus, when a critical mass of individuals made the calculation that joining the antigovernment mass uprisings outweighed potential costs – a calculation brought powerfully to the
forefront by Bouazizi’s death – collective action took place and diffused to other similarly
situated populations. In the existing literature, there is agreement that “the threshold value
represents a ‘safety in numbers’ aspect: the more fellow rebels or protesters, the less chance of
being individually sanctioned by the regime.”41 In the case of the Arab Spring uprisings, the
“exogenous event” of Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the mass action that followed clearly
“influence[d] the benefit-cost considerations of individuals in the system… formerly nonactive
persons [became] active.”42
It is helpful to consider what individual cost-benefit analyses may have looked like in
terms of calculating what would be gained or lost by participating in mass uprisings. Individual
cost-benefit analyses depend critically on threshold levels of engaging in certain behavior. As
Petersen argues, “the more one detests the regime, the more likely one is to accept higher risk” in
engaging in what would be contextually illegal or dangerous behavior.43 Individuals place
subjective value on certain risks, thus varying their threshold level for participation; individuals
that Petersen terms “hotheads or heroes” have very low (close to zero) threshold levels for
participation and are willing to take on extreme risk (ultimate costs, including death or
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imprisonment).44 These “first actors” are essential to any mass uprising or movement; to them,
the benefit of being a “hero” and receiving recognition may outweigh the costs of jeopardizing
their safety or their lives.45
During the Arab Spring, costs for individuals may have been the likelihood of
imprisonment or death for participation; this cost calculation changed as more individuals elected
to participate in this mass behavior. Simultaneously, the chance of individual repercussions (jail,
death, etc.) decreased as more and more people engaged in “punishable” actions, and therefore
the military or the regime would have more difficulty punishing every protester. Beyond costs
related to personal safety, the cost of inaction – of actively choosing not to participate while
everyone else in the immediate vicinity was participating – may have been high; the social
stigmatization of “nonparticipation” may have been enough to incentivize individuals to join
anti-regime movements.46
Individual benefits to be gained from participating in the Arab Spring protests also varied
and cannot be neatly captured, but ranged from potential recognitions of “heroism” to getting rid
of a highly resented regime.47 The perception of the government as a common enemy to an entire
people may have been enough to instigate individual action.48 Individuals may also have
calculated that the overthrow of their respective governments would be beneficial to them not
only politically, but economically; entrenched, normalized corruption made it difficult or
impossible for middle and working-class people to make a living on which they could reasonably
survive. Indeed, Bouazizi’s death symbolized the impossibility of making a living wage under
conditions of extreme and prolonged corruption: “Bouazizi couldn’t get a license to sell fruit
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because he could not afford a bribe. He could not afford a bribe because without a license he
wasn’t allowed to sell fruit.”49 This vicious, seemingly impermeable cycle of poverty was a
driving force behind Arab Spring protests demanding more representative governments and more
opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility. On the whole, benefits to be derived from
participating in anti-regime protests may have included the accumulation of social capital
conferred by association with the pro-democracy movement in these nations.

Chapter III: Existing Explanations
Several existing hypotheses have been advanced to explain why the Arab Spring occurred
and why some countries remained resistant both to protest and to regime change. While these
theories appear persuasive on the surface, they do not withstand the scrutiny of empirical
evidence and existing data. An overview of these existing hypotheses and their failure to explain
variation during the Arab Spring uprisings will be provided here. First, the shortcomings of the
hereditary succession, social media, and diversity hypotheses will be addressed, and then, the
importance yet incompleteness of the oil wealth explanation will be discussed. Exploring the
question of why certain countries experienced mass uprisings and even regime change while
others remained unscathed during the Arab Spring begins to address the puzzle at the heart of
this thesis. Case studies of Libya, Bahrain and Qatar in a later section will further detail the
shortcomings of these hypotheses and the contribution of the labor market demographics
argument in explaining the failure of protests to take hold across the entire MENA region.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49

Danahar, The New Middle East, 42.

Stern 16
The Contagion that Wasn’t: Why Succession Cannot Explain Variation
One hypothesis in the existing literature is that hereditary authoritarian regimes are
particularly resistant to change. Jason Brownlee argues that hereditary succession exists in
nations where rulers do not rely on any type of popular referendum (e.g. elections) to remain in
power and can transfer rule to an heir (e.g. a son).50 This transfer of power within families often
maintains authoritarian governments because, according to the theory, established modes of
succession confer an outward sense of stability: the process of handing off power is not only
entrenched, but hereditary “transfers signal that the state’s repressive agents have rallied around
the executive… to an extraordinary degree.”51 Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds posit that
hereditary regimes that collapsed during the Arab Spring fell not because they were so
repressive, but “because they were not sultanistic enough.”52
However, this theory fails to account for the fact that governments maintained for
decades by hereditary succession varied in their experiences of the Arab Spring. In several
countries where mass protest and overthrow occurred, such as Egypt, and in GCC countries such
as Saudi Arabia alike, authoritarian governments were dominated by “elderly leaders who were
in ‘impending succession crisis’ and widely believed to be angling to install their progeny as
successors.”53 The inherent weakness of undemocratic transition from one unelected leader to
another – Seif al-Islam, son of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and Gamal Mubarak, son of Hosni
Mubarak in Egypt are notable examples – made the Arab Spring uprisings particularly well-
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timed and may have contributed to their successful toppling of regimes in these countries.54
However, the GCC monarchies and oligarchies headed by similarly aging autocrats remained
intact; Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah was estimated to be 90 years old at the time of the Arab
Spring,55 so the ruling Al Saud family would have been selecting and grooming a successor.56
Furthermore, hereditary succession did not necessarily predict which regimes would collapse due
to the defection of the coercive apparatus. In some cases, such as Egypt, the military eventually
defected from the Mubarak government,57 while in other cases, such as Saudi Arabia, the
military not only remained loyal to the civilian government, but also intervened in Bahrain on
behalf of Saudi Arabia’s interests.58 Thus, hereditary succession does not account for variation
during the Arab Spring uprisings.
Hereditary succession itself does not differentiate regimes that did or did not experience
anti-government uprisings during the Arab Spring, and some regimes with hereditary power
handoffs in place succumbed to protests while others did not. More specifically, monarchy as a
particular form of hereditary succession is not a sufficient condition to avoid protest. In Jordan,
mass uprising did occur and the Jordanian monarchy made a “tactical offering of important
liberalizing concessions to protesters” in order to remain in power without a sustained

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54

Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, “Why the Modest Harvest?,” 34.
Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that
Wasn't (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 26.
56
Gerald Butt, "Saudi Arabia: Why Succession Could Become a Princely Tussle," BBC News,
January 23, 2015, accessed March 20, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29792691.
57
Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons
from the Arab Spring," Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (January 2012): 130.
58
Ethan Bronner and Michael Slackman, "Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down
Unrest," The New York Times (New York), March 14, 2011, accessed February 15, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
55

Stern 18
challenge.59 Therefore, there must be another political and economic explanation for why so few
protests and zero regime changes occurred in the GCC.

Coordination Problems, Social Media, and the Role of Al Jazeera
How thousands of individual cost-benefit analyses yielded participation in antigovernment movements that toppled some regimes and left others in a perpetual state of civil
war requires further exploration. This leads to a discussion of how mass mobilization during the
Arab Spring overcame coordination problems. Much of the literature emphasizes the role of
social media and the internet as significant explanatory variables in the Arab Spring’s contagion
and how individuals coordinated their action to form mass movements. Eva Bellin argues that
“social media… enabled the mobilization of collective action in ways that had been heretofore
impossible in repressive settings.”60 However, this explanation does not withstand scrutiny. Antiauthoritarian popular protest occurred long before the advent of social media, and social media
forums generally credited with spreading the Arab Spring, such as Facebook and Twitter, existed
prior to 2011 and thus do not explain why the Arab Spring protests occurred when they did.
Tweets and Facebook posts about the Arab Spring uprisings are also unlikely to be representative
of the myriad disenchanted populations that engaged in mass protests, populations that likely had
little or no regular internet and social media access to use these resources consistently to spread
revolutionary attitudes. As one author acknowledges, “the internet has been used as a tool by
middle-class activists; it has not been the chief factor behind the Arab Spring.”61 This is not to
say that the internet and social media played no role in accelerating the Arab Spring uprisings,
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but these modes of communication were not as decisive as many scholars frame them to have
been.
If social media and internet usage powerfully explain observed outcomes, then it would
be expected that the use of these technologies in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya was
higher than in the GCC. However, datasets consistently demonstrate that the GCC nations had
more access to the internet and more widely made use of Facebook and social media than people
in Egypt, Tunisia or other uprising-affected nations. Existing data concerning both general
internet usage by percentage of populations and Facebook’s penetration on a country by country
level do not support this explanation, and anecdotal evidence further confirms that social media
could not have played the decisive role that the literature suggests.
According to data from the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) World
Telecommunication database and reprinted by the World Bank,62 as of 2010, GCC countries had
more internet users per 100 people (percentage of population) than other MENA nations where
major Arab Spring uprisings took place and in some cases, toppled governments:
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Internet Usage Per 100 People (as of 2010)
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Additionally, data collected from Internet World Statistics and mapped by TargetMap, an online
service that condenses publicly available data on socioeconomic indicators, shows that Facebook
penetration (the percentage of a country’s population using Facebook) was consistently higher in
GCC nations than in other MENA countries in the year of major Arab Spring uprisings:63
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Facebook Penetration, Percent of Population (as of March 2011)
56.8%

Percent age of Population

60.0%

46.7%

50.0%
40.0%
30.6%
30.0%

24.9%

22.2%
15.7%

20.0%
10.0%

9.2%

8.0%
1.1%

1.4%

0.0%
Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

Saudi
Arabia

UAE

Egypt

Libya

Syria Tunisia Yemen

Country

As Matthiesen notes, “a peculiarity of the Gulf is that social media were used… arguably
even more so than in Egypt, Tunisia, or Syria. Given the wealth and high standard of living
across the region… smartphone[s] and access to social media” were widespread in the GCC.64
These observations are further complemented by anecdotal evidence. On the whole, the Arab
Spring uprisings were not as neatly planned and organized on social media as many scholars
have suggested. A 2012 study of the protests found that “organized movements did not drive
events across the Arab world; the lead role was played by ‘loose coalitions of disparate groups
and individuals.’”65 In fact, “young revolutionaries would later recall coming across other protest
marches entirely by accident.”66
Here, the concept of protest cycles is useful to explain the growth of Arab Spring
uprisings. In Egypt (and elsewhere), where uprisings began as “nonviolent tactics” such as public
gatherings and the government responded with increasingly intense and violent confrontations,
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protests escalated and spread.67 This escalation was cyclical: the first peaceful protest in Egypt
took place on January 25, 2011, and police and military personnel responded with brutal force
while the civilian government shut off internet and mobile phone access.68 In fact, as Danahar
reports, the Egyptian government had actually “switched the internet off and largely disabled the
mobile phone network” by Egypt’s major uprising at the end of January 2011.69 Three days later,
on January 28, 2011, Egyptian protesters escalated in response to violent government
crackdowns; the “demonstrations around [Cairo] couldn’t communicate with one another, but
they all knew where they wanted to be, Tahrir Square. Everything else just happened.”70
This example powerfully illustrates how protest cycles operated where governments
escalated in response to civilian protest, and how protests spread and grew without access to the
internet or social media. Where violence was preemptive by the government to prevent potential
unrest – such as in Saudi Arabia – and, paradoxically, where the internet remained “on” –
protests did not forcefully take root to challenge the government in any meaningful way. Thus,
the actual roles of social media and advanced communication technology should be questioned.
A much more compelling case has been made in the literature for the influence of Al
Jazeera in bringing down individual threshold levels and encouraging mass participation in a
pan-Arab push for political liberalization. At the forefront of Arab news media, Al Jazeera is an
international broadcasting network owned and funded by Qatar.71 The role of Al Jazeera was
influential in “downplaying differences among Arab states… providing a cognitive framework
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for the dynamic, cascading interaction among protests and revolutions.”72 The creation of a
shared narrative of struggling against oppression and utilizing strength in numbers against
tyrannical, unrepresentative rule across the region, uniting all Arab people in a common cause,
became a dominant driving force of the uprisings.73 However, Al Jazeera is accessible
worldwide, and given the more widespread availability of communications technologies in the
Gulf, it is likely that people in the GCC had even better access to Al Jazeera than their rioting
counterparts in North Africa. Therefore, Al Jazeera and access to information alone cannot
explain why certain countries did not experience violent turmoil and regime overthrow during
the Arab Spring.
The broad availability of and access to Al Jazeera does helpfully explain how
coordination was achieved and the free-rider problem overcome in the case of Tunisian,
Egyptian, Libyan and Yemeni uprisings. The free rider problem, outlined in Mancur Olson’s
collective action model, posits that since collective action is anything that provides a public,
collective good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous – in the case of the Arab Spring, more
democratic governance and improved socioeconomic conditions – rational actors “are motivated
to free ride on the contributions of others.”74 Why the Arab Spring uprisings that toppled regimes
appear to have overcome the free rider problem can be explained by Chong’s popular
mobilization model.75
According to Chong’s model, “bandwagon rates (mobilization due to prior success)” are
modified by the actions of other players in a given protest scenario – in the case of the Arab
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Spring, discontented citizens (protesters) and authoritarian governments.76 During the Arab
Spring, individuals in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria gathered that they had
more to gain from protest than from inaction, and thus engaged in collective behavior at everincreasing rates; individuals in these contexts evaluated their participation in and goals of the
movement as more valuable than the costs.77 Al Jazeera, not necessarily the internet or social
media, publicized and spread news of prior successes across the region, and encouraged
mobilization for a common, pan-Arab sense of purpose and identity. With Al Jazeera’s indirect
help, a critical mass of individuals made the calculation that a liberalized state would be an
improvement over the status quo, despite potential costs, and thus, it was “economical for [them]
to contribute” to collective actions.78 Enough people chose not to free ride that the Arab Spring
uprisings both occurred and in some contexts, effectively ended the harsh rule of tyrannical
autocrats.

The Diversity Argument
Another existing argument is that homogenous societies are inherently more stable than
heterogeneous ones, and therefore, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity can explain crossregional variation during the Arab Spring. Proponents of this alternative argument would point to
Bahrain (discussed in depth in a later section) for its religious divides, Libya’s tribal divisions,
and Egypt’s sectarian violence as evidence that cleavages and cross-cutting diversities are
reliable predictors of unrest. This alternative argument is severely limited in its explanatory
power for a few reasons. First, diversity exists everywhere and varies in kind, but the Arab
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Spring, and protests more generally, did not and do not occur everywhere. There are potential
axes of division in all MENA nations, including GCC states; diversity in terms of socioeconomic
status, religious beliefs, and political affiliations can divide any society.
Second, the Arab Spring was avoided entirely by some very diverse Middle Eastern
countries, such as Lebanon.79 Lebanon is home to Shia and Sunni Muslims, a sizable Christian
population, and is a site of refuge for thousands of intra-regional refugees.80 Therefore, the
heterogeneity argument does not meaningfully or adequately explain regional variation during
the Arab Spring uprisings.

Oil
Oil economics is another prominent existing explanation for why certain countries
withstood the Arab Spring uprisings. Unlike hereditary succession, social media, and diversity
arguments, the oil hypothesis is not inaccurate, but merely incomplete. As presented, the oil
hypothesis is elementally correct – oil wealth does matter to stability and regime staying power –
but not in the way currently theorized. Instead, oil wealth is important for the labor market
exigencies it creates, and the labor markets and the demographics that result in oil-rich MENA
nations are useful in explaining regional variation during the Arab Spring uprisings.
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Michael Ross argues that nationalized oil resources in the MENA region have not only
allowed authoritarian leaders to remain in power, but have shored up the stability of these
regimes for several reasons:
“First, it has allowed them to buy off citizens by providing them with many benefits with
virtually no taxation… Second, autocrats who get most of their funding from national oil
industries find it easier to keep their countries' finances secret… Finally, oil wealth
allows autocrats to lavishly fund - and buy the loyalty of - their armed forces.”81
By this logic, governments with massive natural resources use this wealth to buy the passivity of
their people. On some level, this occurred in the context of the Arab Spring. Several Gulf
countries used their astounding oil and natural resource wealth to buy off opposing factions; in
Saudi Arabia, “the king announced massive spending programs… made possible by high oil
prices to weather the storm,”82 in Kuwait, the “government announced a grant of US$3,500 to
every [citizen], as well as a year’s worth of free staples such as sugar, cooking oil, and milk,”
and in Qatar, the government “declared that it would raise public-sector salaries and pensions by
60%, at a cost of more than $8 billion.”83
However, resource wealth alone is insufficient to explain variation in social mobilization
during the Arab Spring. Libya is considered oil-rich, but experienced massive uprising,
government overthrow and regime collapse.84 Similar to ruling autocrats in the Gulf, Gaddafi
“used oil wealth and his own unique brand of populism to keep Libyans atomized while building
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up a vast coercive apparatus;”85 the Libyan regime “funnel[ed] much of its oil wealth into public
handouts.”86 That the Libyan government deployed its riches from resource wealth to coerce the
Libyan people into passive acceptance of the regime suggests that there is more to understanding
protest diffusion than oil wealth in the MENA region.
The following data gathered from the Central Intelligence Agency’s ranking of countries
by oil production (in billions of barrels) highlights why oil wealth does not neatly correlate with
experience of uprising or regime overthrow during the Arab Spring:87
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Qatar, which experienced no major uprising, let alone regime overthrow,90 is ranked lower in
terms of oil production – and thus reliance on resource wealth – than Libya, a country that
collapsed entirely during the Arab Spring. Oil wealth is thus no longer a consistently strong
indicator of the likelihood of stability; Dubai, one of the seven emirates of the UAE, which is
one of the wealthiest GCC nations that experienced no uprising, is not as oil rich as other areas
(e.g. Libya), but employs hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of migrant laborers in
construction projects.91 Oil wealth is still important to explaining the Arab Spring uprisings
because the oil industry and the projects born of it, such as large-scale construction, are largely
the reasons why the Gulf states employ migrant labor on such massive scales. Therefore, oil
wealth is still significant, but not in the way that the literature currently posits. Resource wealth
on its own is not sufficient to explain variation, but the labor force demographics created by the
exigencies of resource-rich nations usefully fill this analytical void.
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Chapter IV: The Hypothesis, Causal Mechanisms, and Evidence
“As paradigms fall and theories are shredded by events on the ground, it is useful to recall that
the Arab revolts resulted not from policy decisions taken in Washington or any other foreign
capital, but from indigenous economic, political and social factors whose dynamics were
extremely hard to forecast.”92
The Hypothesis
The demographics of the labor forces in the Gulf states consistently separate the GCC
nations from other MENA countries. Political indicators such as authoritarianism, hereditary rule
within families, and the absence of democratic infrastructure are common to all nations across
the region, with the exceptions of Israel and Turkey. Similarly, oil wealth does not meaningfully
distinguish the GCC from non-GCC nations that experienced massive uprising and government
collapse; Libya is an oil-rich nation. Therefore, as the previous section more extensively
reviewed, existing hypotheses that posit that these indicators can meaningfully explain regional
variation during the Arab Spring uprisings are inadequate.
On the surface, it appears that the Arab Spring can be explained by unemployment.
Nations with high unemployment rates, such as Egypt and Tunisia, were decimated by the Arab
Spring uprisings.93 Explanations for the problem of unemployment and its role as a driving force
of the Arab Spring have rested on the issue of bulging youth populations without meaningful or
sustainable opportunities for upward social mobility; absent means of gainful employment, youth
in particular took to the streets to demand better from their governments.94 Missing from this
narrative is why such unemployment problems existed in these countries and not in other MENA
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nations at this particular historical moment. The Arab Spring uprisings would obviously not have
occurred without thousands of individuals coming together and engaging in collective action
with a common purpose. A “shared fatigue with authoritarian rule” may be the underlying
emotional impetus that drove many people across the region to take to the streets and protest
tyrannical rule, harsh treatment, and economic hardship, 95 but such systems of oppression
existed in this region for decades, so why did the Arab Spring occur when and where it did?
Since unemployment and fiscal indicators had been problems for years in these countries, these
factors by themselves do not explain the timing, occurrence, or variation of the Arab Spring.
Labor force demographics in the Middle East help to fill this analytical gap.
The independent variable in this hypothesis is a sizable non-Arab, mainly Asian migrant
worker population. “Sizable” in this context is considered to be 50% or more of a country’s labor
force.96†† The presence of this variable, which is consistent across the GCC nations, likely helped
to produce the dependent variable, a lack of political, anti-government protests and in turn,
regime stability through the course of the Arab Spring. In countries where this independent
variable was absent, massive protests, regime overthrow, and in some cases, civil war, took
place.
The labor force demographics hypothesis explains the overall lack of protests in the GCC
countries for several interrelated reasons. First, in the GCC nations, there were reduced
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95

Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, "What Best Explains Successful Protest
Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring," International Studies Review 15 (2013): 48,
accessed February 2, 2015, doi:10.1111/misr.12020.
96
Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries:
National Patterns and Trends, research report no. 15 (London: Kuwait Programme on Development,
Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf States, 2011), 9, accessed April 27, 2014,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/kuwait/research/papers/labourimmigration.aspx.
††
The exact number of Asian migrant workers in each country’s labor force does not affect
results because the number of migrant workers in non-GCC MENA states is negligible or zero. Thus, the
precise population of non-native Asian migrant workers in the Gulf is not necessary to differentiate
meaningfully between labor force demographics in GCC versus non-GCC countries.

Stern 31
incentives to protest, and the demographics of these countries’ labor forces are proxies for these
reduced incentives. Those with the political capital to credibly challenge the government by
massive, anti-regime social mobilization – citizens of GCC nations – lack the immediate
motivation to do so because they benefit from the regime status quo: a continuous supply of
cheap migrant labor from Asia. This cheap migrant labor is indicative of low domestic
unemployment because migrant laborers fill jobs that GCC citizens do not want or would not do
themselves; such levels of migrant laborers comprising the GCC workforce suggests that GCC
citizens are well enough off to be able to refuse to do the menial jobs for which migrant labor is
heavily imported.97
While in some contexts foreign labor migration may be seen as a threat to domestic job
markets and economies, the Asian migrant labor force in the Gulf is recognized as “pivotal to the
impressive and rapid transformation of the region’s infrastructure.”98 In fact, the Asian migrant
labor force recruited by the kafala system in the GCC – a form of labor sponsorship between
employers and migrant employees discussed at length later on – does the jobs that are considered
“beneath” Gulf citizens, and therefore GCC nationals would not do these jobs regardless.99
Additionally, immigrant populations are politically, economically and socially segregated from
Gulf nationals, so the idea that labor migrants are “invading” the space of GCC citizens is not
necessarily accurate.100 Citizens in Gulf countries benefit so much from the kafala system and
the migrant labor that it recruits that it would not be in their general interests to do anything to
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unseat or upset this system; the kafala system provides Gulf employers with a steady supply of
cheap, exploitable labor and the recruited migrant workers do jobs that otherwise would not be
filled by citizens. Thus, the benefits that GCC citizens derive from migrant labor is dependent on
the kafala system itself.
Second, cost-benefit analyses regarding the decision to protest in the GCC countries
likely led individuals to calculate that the cost of protesting outweighed potential benefits not
only because the economic and political status quo is largely favorable to most GCC citizens, but
also because migrant laborers frequently protest in these countries and these regimes crack down
rapidly and violently against protesters, thus raising the cost of engaging in such behavior.
Intolerance of protests in these regimes means that governments are ready to crack down to
punish such behavior if and when it arises. Since migrant laborers in these nations regularly
strike and protest unfair treatment, consequences of this behavior are swift and harsh: migrant
laborers who organize and stage collective strikes or protests are imprisoned, deported, or killed.
By way of demonstration effect, the costs suffered by migrant laborers who protest are warnings
to GCC citizens against engaging in similar behavior for fear of facing the same consequences.
As the theory of regime change cascade notes, “demonstration effects also worked in the
opposite direction, driving [GCC] countries’ leaderships to crack down. Saudi Arabia actually
helped other regimes brutally suppress revolutionary dissent.”101 Some Gulf countries such as
Saudi Arabia cracked down preemptively on their populations in the wake of the Arab Spring,
stemming the tide of protest diffusion to these countries and helping to short-circuit potential
uprisings against the government.102 After protests in Tunisia ignited similar behavior in Egypt
and other MENA countries, the threat of the Arab Spring spreading to the GCC prompted
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preemptive action by authoritarian Gulf states. This preemption radically changed any potential
cost-benefit analysis of individuals in the Gulf contemplating engaging in collective behavior. In
the context of protest intolerance, the regime is ready to crack down against popular
demonstrations whenever and however they manifest.
The threat of violence against potential protesters was not the GCC’s only source of
reverse-demonstration effect scare tactics; the consequences of migrant laborers’ nongovernment sanctioned, anti-institutional protests demanding better treatment were observed by
GCC nationals for years, and the costs of such behavior – prison or worse – were effectively
outweighed by potential benefits. The readiness and brutality of regime crackdowns against
frequent migrant labor protests are significant because these costs of protesting in these contexts
deter other potential protesters from engaging in this behavior. Labor protests by migrants are
met with police violence, and in the case of some domestic workers in the Gulf, sexual assault.103
While it could be argued that since migrant laborers are fundamentally disenfranchised actors
without real agency in the context of GCC nations where they are forced to work in inhumane
conditions, the consequences they suffer for protesting would not necessarily deter GCC
nationals, who have more political agency, from engaging in similar behavior against their
governments. However, as will be discussed later in this section, people in the GCC during the
Arab Spring did have the inclination to protest – they created and joined online petitions and
social media pages that aimed to organize anti-regime activities – but were deterred from
actually taking to the streets. The demonstration effect of migrant laborers’ protests and the
consequences they suffered help to explain why these online movements largely failed to
materialize as actual mass protests.
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It is further significant to note that in countries without Asian migrant labor populations,
protests not only took root, but gained the support of thousands of disenchanted citizens and in
some cases, toppled regimes and began civil wars. The absence of this explanatory variable is
thus important to the occurrence, course, and outcomes of mass protests in the Arab Spring. In
countries with substantial Asian migrant labor populations, labor force demographics and the
resulting political dynamics in these nations short-circuited Arab Spring protest diffusion to the
GCC countries. Where potential protesters had reduced incentives to demonstrate and where the
regime regularly, publicly, and harshly put down labor strikes and protests by migrant workers,
mass anti-regime collective action did not successfully manifest. This overall lack of meaningful
challenge to the existing authoritarian power structures in these countries can be traced to the
presence of sizable Asian migrant labor populations and what these labor force demographics in
turn indicate about these countries.

Proposed Causal Mechanisms
At least two causal mechanisms underpin this hypothesis. The first is the demonstration
effect. Asian migrant workers in the Gulf states are lured by promised opportunities of relatively
high-paying jobs in oil and construction industries, but they are subjected to inhumane conditions
upon their arrival. Most of these Asian migrants come to work in the Gulf via the kafala system,
which is a form of agreement with Asian labor-sending countries that, as will be discussed in
more detail in later parts of this section, tie migrant laborers to their employers, stripping them of
their passports and withholding their pay to severely constrain or eliminate their mobility within
the Gulf.104 Thus, Asian migrant workers often strike to demand better living and working
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conditions. These strikes lead to disastrous consequences for the migrant laborers; often, labor
protest participants are jailed, deported or killed. By way of demonstration effect, migrant
laborers’ protests function as a warning to Gulf populations that may have been considering
protesting against their respective governments; the consequences for protests are so harsh in
those countries, and Gulf citizens have clearly much more to lose from protesting than migrant
laborers do, that the real costs of protesting for Gulf citizens outweighed potential benefits. The
comments of UAE labor minister Ali al-Kaabi best summarize this causal mechanism: on the
topic of rioting Asian migrant laborers, he said, those migrant laborers “‘would be deported…
[they] will be used as a lesson to others’” who may have been contemplating similar behavior.105
This sentiment reflects the theoretical underpinnings of the demonstration effect at work during
the Arab Spring: harsh punishment for a specific activity was made public in order to
disincentivize other groups from engaging in the same behavior.
The only Gulf country that does not employ the kafala system and thus has more lenient
policies governing migrant laborers is Bahrain. Historically, unlike other GCC nations, Bahrain
has allowed labor unions to form.106 This difference between Bahrain and the rest of the Gulf
helps to explain why Bahrain did experience major protests that the Saudi Arabian army
quashed.107 Asian migrant laborers had less to protest in Bahrain, thus the demonstration effect
was not as strong in Bahrain as in other GCC nations. The particularities of the Bahraini case
will be discussed further in the case study section of this thesis.
The second causal mechanism that demonstrates why a sizable non-Arab migrant labor
population helps to explain variation in political unrest is the issue of unemployment. While
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105

McDougal, "Tourists Targeted as Dubai Workers Stage Revolt.”
Abd Al-Hadi Khalaf, "Labor Movements in Bahrain," Middle East Research and Information
Project 15 (May/June 1985), accessed March 20, 2015, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer132/labormovements-bahrain.
107
Bronner and Slackman, "Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest."
106

Stern 36
unemployment has been offered in the existing literature to explain the onset and spread of the
Arab Spring uprisings, the root cause of unemployment in non-GCC MENA countries, and by
contrast, the relatively low levels of unemployment in the GCC, is a more nuanced argument that
requires exploring labor force demographics. Unemployment was high in the non-GCC nations
at this historical moment because unskilled labor from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria had been
imported to the Gulf states until the GCC nations changed their labor preferences; Asian migrant
labor supplanted intraregional migrant labor, thus leaving former labor-sending MENA countries
with major unemployment problems. The literature cites several reasons for the GCC nations’
shift in preferences from Arab to Asian migrant workers. In sum, GCC nations began to favor
Asian migrant labor because workers from non-Arab states were easier to recruit, coerce and
control; Asian migrant workers do not generally speak or understand Arabic and are thought to
pose less of a political threat to internal security and stability in GCC countries.108
In the remainder of this section, relevant data and anecdotal evidence will be marshaled
to demonstrate the significance of the labor force demographics hypothesis, these proposed
causal mechanisms, and how they operated during the Arab Spring.

Why Labor Markets?: Data and Empirical Evidence
While the causes of the Arab Spring uprisings “are numerous and complex, [they] have
been exacerbated by the region’s underlying demographics.”109 Unlike other variables – such as
oil wealth – labor market demographics dominated by non-Arab migrant workers consistently
correlate with countries that did not experience massive uprising in the Arab Spring. According
to existing datasets, non-Arab (mostly Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, and Indonesian) foreigners
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comprise approximately 50% or more of GCC countries’ labor forces, and approximately 40% of
these countries’ total populations.110 One report estimates that the influx of Asian migrant
workers swelled to “40 million by 2005,” accounting for “the most rapid population growth
anywhere in the world during that period.”111
Second, the GCC has undergone a fundamental shift in labor preferences. Before the
onset of the Arab Spring, countries such as Egypt and Tunisia sent labor to the oil-rich and
construction industry-heavy GCC countries. However, GCC nations have shown a preference for
non-Arab migrant workers, most of whom come from South Asia. There are several reasons for
this preference change: first, GCC governments worried about migrants from other, more
politically “liberal” Arab nations coming to their countries to work and in turn, spreading antigovernment concepts.112 In Qatar, for example, hundreds of Egyptian workers were forcibly
returned to Egypt in 1996 when Qatar accused the Egyptian government of attempting a coup.113
Second, in the post-1970s oil boom, GCC demands for cheap labor outpaced other Arab nations’
supplies, and Asian governments have constructed formal agreements with GCC nations – the
so-called kafala system,114 whereby Asian labor became more accessible and cheaper in GCC
countries.115
The kafala system is understood as a form of sponsorship: employers or governments
“sponsor” laborers’ visas to enter and remain in GCC countries; the employer then controls the
sponsored workers’ abilities to leave the country, often by retaining their passports and work
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visas.116 This system was originally intended to provide short-term migrant labor to oil-exporting
countries, but in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the Second Iraq War, during which times the
GCC countries expelled millions of Arab laborers from geographically proximate countries
interpreted to be linked and/or sympathetic to the crises, demand for Asian migrant labor
increased exponentially.117 Misleading potential workers with promises of high wages, labor
recruiters in Asian countries offer to pay the cost of laborers’ travel to GCC nations, and allow
laborers to repay this loan with interest over time; in reality, “the result is virtual debt
bondage.”118 Upon arrival in their GCC destination, migrant laborers’ visas are taken as
collateral by their employers, and their wages are kept sufficiently low as to prevent them from
the ability to repay their “loans” with interest in a timely manner.119 This dynamic keeps laborers
tethered to employers and to exploitative conditions; migrants who do not speak Arabic often
sign agreements that they cannot understand that commit them to years of low wages without
recourse.120 The kafala system is sustainable despite these “bait and switch” tactics because even
the promise of employment in the Gulf is often better than the status quo in some Asian laborsending countries.121
Two interrelated causal mechanisms illustrate how labor force demographics of the GCC
explain variation in social movements across the MENA region during the Arab Spring, and why
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the GCC countries remained relatively stable throughout this time period. These mechanisms and
their operation will be discussed in turn in this section.

Protests and the Demonstration Effect
In order to analyze the demonstration effect’s operation in this context, data on protest
activity in the GCC and in some Arab Spring-affected MENA nations was collected. The aim of
this data is to gain a better understanding of protest patterns and behavior in the region over a
period of time, and to see if labor-related demonstrations by migrant workers could have
operated as a deterrent. In order to understand if and how labor-related demonstrations and their
aftermath affected anti-government activity in these nations before, during, and after the Arab
Spring, data was retrieved from the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT),
an online research tool that collects news and media reports about events and incidents
worldwide and generates download-ready spreadsheets by keyword and location searches.122
These GDELT searches were run for every GCC country and, for the purposes of comparison,
two of the non-GCC MENA nations that experienced massive protest and regime collapse –
Egypt and Libya.
Country-specific searches were conducted as follows: the data range was limited by date
from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2012 to include time before, during, and immediately
after the major Arab Spring uprisings. For each GCC nation, in addition to Egypt and Libya, the
following search criteria, as specified on the GDELT site, were completed as such for laborrelated protests: Initiator = “Labor,” Recipient Country = “Country Name,” Event Code =
“Protest,” Event Location = “Country Name.” Running searches with these parameters yielded
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the graphs below, labeled respectively. To create graphs of government-related protests by
civilians, searches for the same set of countries were limited by the same date range, and the
following search criteria were completed as such: Initiator = “Civilian,” Recipient = “Country
Name,” Recipient Type = “Government,” Event Code = “Protest,” Event Location = “Country
Name.” These searches yielded the following results:

Labor-Related Protests in the GCC, by country
16

12

Kuwait

10

Bahrain

8

UAE

6

Saudi Arabia

4

Oman

2

Qatar

0
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Year

Anti-Government Protests in the GCC, 2005-2012
8

7

7
Number of Protests

Number of Protests

14

6
5
Bahrain

4
3
2

Saudi Arabia

2
1

1

1

1

1
0
2007

2008

2009
Year

2011

2012

UAE

Stern 41

Number of Protests

Labor Protests in Egypt and Libya, 2005-2012
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

176

Egypt
42
4

4

6

7

10

0
2006

0
2007

0
2008

0
2009

0
2010

17

Libya

9

2011

2012

Year

Anti-Government Protests in Egypt and Libya,
2005-2012
Number of Protests

60

52

50
40
30

10

Egypt

17

20

Libya

6

4

1

0
2009

2011

2012

Year

At best, this data must be read as approximations of real events; GDELT data is only as
accurate as the online and print media that it compiles and searches. Independent research on
online databases of news media, such as Lexis Nexis, further supports this contention: searches
for labor protests in Qatar between 2005 and 2012 yielded more than one incident. Additionally,
some of the data that GDELT gathers may be duplicates, which is to say that the same event may
be reported by various news sources and thus be counted more than once by GDELT as separate
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events. It is also important to note that GDELT does not provide more detailed information on
the complexities of the identities of actors in a given event – for example, who is protesting
against what or whom, the fact that some workers are citizens while others are migrants/noncitizens, etc. Therefore, since some areas and countries are more widely and reliably covered by
reporters than others, and since every event that occurs in every country, especially those that are
toxic to the media, cannot reasonably be expected to be recorded and the same event may be
cited by GDELT multiple times, GDELT data serves as an imperfect mode of approximating
events. Data from GDELT is nonetheless useful because it overcomes the logistical concern of
gathering information on the instances of protest in this region of the world; given time and
budget constraints, data from GDELT is preferable to not citing any data at all. Additionally, this
data provides both an overview of temporal trends in protest behavior and events within
countries in this region.
Overall, the data cited throughout this section are at best approximations for two reasons.
First, it is extremely difficult to count and to capture the number of protest events and individual
migrant laborers in any country, but especially in the GCC nations; not only are many migrant
workers undocumented, but GCC countries are considered “black boxes” – they rarely divulge
potentially sensitive information. This is related to the second reason that this data should be
considered approximations: many GCC nations do not regularly report unemployment statistics
or other relevant fiscal data to the World Bank or similar international bodies. Thus, this data
cannot be considered completely accurate, but rather a best estimate given logistical constraints.
Cursory glances at these graphs provide some basic understanding of the impact labor
protests likely had on anti-government mass movements in the GCC. The sheer number of laborrelated protests is clearly larger than instances of protest against governments in most GCC

Stern 43
countries. In fact, according to this data, most of the GCC did not experience any instances of
anti-government protest from 2005 to 2012. If every GCC country is understood to be politically
repressive, then laws that prohibit speaking out against the government in these nations do not
fully explain why some countries experienced anti-government uprising over this time period
while others did not. This phenomenon highlights why labor force demographics and labor
strikes are significant, and how the demonstration effect may operate in this situation.
The demonstration effect posits that the observable behavior of a given group and the
consequences of that behavior can meaningfully impact another group’s inclination to act
similarly in a comparable context. Native Arab populations (i.e. nationals) of the Gulf countries
were deterred from protesting and mass collective action because the large Asian migrant worker
populations in these countries organized, mobilized and staged strikes often and unsuccessfully
in the years preceding and during the Arab Spring.123 Governments’ and corporations’ abilities to
quash (with the use of violent force) these protests and the negative consequences that followed
for the protesters showed the national Arab population – who, unlike the migrant workers, would
be salient political actors challenging their government – that to do so would be both dangerous
and futile.124 By way of cost-benefit analyses, citizens of the GCC nations calculated that,
despite any anti-government sentiment or inclination to protest, to engage in similar behavior
would be too risky, but for migrant laborers who are completely politically disempowered, such
behavior is their means of asserting agency in an oppressive situation. Unlike GCC citizens,
migrant workers calculate protest participation to be more beneficial than leaving their status quo
unchallenged.
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All of the GCC nations experienced some form of labor-related protest in the 2005-2012
period, but only half of these countries also experienced some form of anti-government protest.
Of the few cases of anti-government protest that GDELT searches yielded, what is coded as
“anti-government protest” may not actually be citizens of a particular country making demands
for change in their government. For example, the singular anti-government protest in the UAE
after several labor-related protests reported in years prior merits further explanation. This protest,
according to GDELT data, occurred in December 2008. According to the United States
Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in order for political protests to take place
in the UAE, they must first be approved by the government.125 This particular instance of
“government” protest – what is probably better understood as government-approved protest –
were gatherings of people demonstrating against the conflict in the Gaza Strip.126 Therefore, this
protest did not present a major challenge to the UAE government itself; non-government
sanctioned protests by workers in the UAE and the consequences of these public displays of
collective action likely persuaded UAE citizens not to protest their government, if citizens were
so inclined to stage a mass movement against the Emirates’ rulers.
Multiple reports of Asian laborers protesting in the UAE support this analysis. In 2006,
several reports surfaced about collective action by migrant laborers in the UAE, especially in
Dubai.127 Migrant workers, many of whom came from India and Pakistan to Dubai to work on
the city’s construction projects, were “angered by low salaries and mistreatment,” and they
protested to demand better wages and more humane working conditions.128 One estimate
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concludes that Asian migrant workers in the UAE staged over “two dozen strikes” in a single
year… mainly in Dubai.”129
In November 2007, a similar event occurred: thousands of migrant laborers staged a
strike at a construction worksite in Dubai.130 Authorities arrested “about 4,000 protesters… and
more than a dozen [were] deported.”131 In 2008, over a thousand migrant laborers in Dubai
staged a protest over wages, only one month after “45 Indian construction workers” were jailed
for the same behavior.132 Thus, the demonstration effect essentially “warns” those with
something to lose – UAE citizens who judge anti-government protest to be too personally and/or
politically costly – against such behavior, but poor, politically powerless migrant workers assess
that jail, deportation, or physical harm could not be worse than their conditions that mimic
indentured servitude.
The demonstration effect mechanism hinges on deterrence, which means that for the
consequences of migrant laborers’ protests to dissuade Gulf citizens from protesting, GCC
nationals would have had to have the inclination to protest their governments in the first place.
Evidence that this inclination existed comes from online petitions and Facebook groups calling
for GCC citizens to participate in protests and mobilize against their respective governments. In
the UAE, an online petition calling for political liberalization and open elections was widely
circulated.133 In fact, the petition became so popular that online activists promoting and
publicizing the petition and its message were arrested and jailed as “extremists” charged with
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crimes against the state.134 Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, “over ten thousand people had signed up
on Facebook to participate in a Day of Rage,”135 but no one actually took to the streets.136 As will
be discussed further in the case study section of this thesis, a similar Facebook page existed
calling for mobilization in Qatar, but no anti-government protest occurred.137 What is common to
all of these countries and what also separates them from non-GCC nations where protests did
occur is discontented, exploited Asian migrant laborers that dominate the domestic workforce in
each of these nations; these migrant workers strike and protest frequently, facing serious and
often brutal consequences. The experiences of the migrant laborers in the GCC warned Gulf
nationals not to engage in the same behavior; thus, Gulf citizens’ social media movements did
not manifest as protests on the streets.

Explaining Saudi Arabia and Oman
The cases of two GCC nations – Saudi Arabia and Oman – are worth discussing in
greater detail. Labor protests in Saudi Arabia appear to spike in 2012 after remaining low or
relatively constant in prior years. It is worth noting that these protests occurred after Saudi
Arabia intervened in Bahrain to quash the anti-government liberalization movement there.
Additionally, all forms of free expression are punishable by prison sentence in Saudi Arabia;
according to an Amnesty International report, several cases of what the Saudi government may
term a “protest” related to labor or other grievances may just be small groups of people
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demanding fair treatment, distributing “state-banned books,” or merely identifying as a member
of the minority Shia population.138
The demonstration effect operated in Saudi Arabia in a very unique manner. In October
2011, Chinese laborers in Saudi Arabia staged a protest; these workers went on strike from a
“rail construction project.”139 In response, Saudi officials arrested those involved in the strike.140
Despite this instance of public consequences of protest, in several Saudi Arabian provinces
outside of major cities, Shia minority groups protested against the government, resulting in
crackdowns on several local demonstrations to signal that to engage in such behavior is more
costly than beneficial.141 Protesters “from the Shia minority in the Eastern Province dared defy
the [protest ban].”142 The willingness of Shia communities to protest despite known danger likely
stemmed from “discrimination that Saudi Shia endure, which effectively makes them secondclass citizens.”143 In fact, “a dangerous spiral of protest, repression and public funerals”
maintained the fervor of Shia protests in Saudi Arabia.144 Thus, the cost-benefit analysis for the
populations actually engaged in these protests was fundamentally different; it is unlikely that
Shia protesters would have been dissuaded by the consequences faced by protesting migrant
laborers. In the case of an attempted, more centrally-located and mainstream protest that may
have actually threatened the Saudi regime, “only one protester, Khalid al-Juhani, showed up and
was arrested” for attempting to demonstrate – alone – in Riyadh.145 In Saudi Arabia on the
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whole, the demonstration effect successfully repressed anti-government collective action that
would meaningfully challenge the entrenched authoritarian regime.
Oman is also a particular case. Of the six GCC nations, “Oman was the first… to
experience popular protests in January 2011.”146 In Oman, “the 2011 protests were largely
directed against an oligarchy perceived as corrupt and misleading the country.”147 One
particularly contentious issue was the failure of the government to hire Omani nationals for work
on developing an industrial center in Sohar; protests were “sparked off after young unemployed
people were told that there would be no job opportunities for them.”148 It is worth noting that, as
will be discussed in a later sub-section, Oman had the highest domestic unemployment rate of
any GCC nation, and thus was perhaps already more prone to protest than the other GCC
member countries. In response to unrest, the sultan of Oman met some of the demands of his
people – including the creation of thousands of jobs and an increase in minimum salaries – but
did not make any major or meaningful changes to the government itself.149

Egypt and Libya: At the Heart of the Arab Spring
Protests in Egypt and Libya greatly departed in number, intensity, and outcome from
those in the select few Gulf states that experienced some unrest. It is clear that more reporting
was done on Egypt than on Libya during this time period, perhaps because of the initial
magnitude of the protests and regime overthrow in Egypt immediately after protests began in
Tunisia, or perhaps because of Egypt’s proximity and relationship to Israel, America’s key ally
in the MENA region and a source of international fixation, or a combination of political,
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diplomatic and economic concerns that made Egypt particularly compelling to news sources. A
clear pattern emerges in this data: in both Egypt and Libya, protests related to labor and antigovernment movements peaked in 2011, the height of the Arab Spring. Labor protests in Egypt
are worth exploring further, and actually contribute to a causal mechanism that helps to explain
why labor force demographics matter to variation in anti-government uprisings throughout the
MENA region during the Arab Spring.

Economic Preconditions: Unemployment and Fiscal Indicators
Historically, Egypt was a labor-sending country to GCC economies. In the 1970s, the
GCC accepted migrant labor from within the MENA region, generally from countries with little
or no oil wealth and without means of employing their populations.150 However, labor
preferences in the GCC shifted due first to the drop in oil prices in the 1980s, when oil-producing
countries scaled back their work forces, and then again in the 1990s when oil production once
again became lucrative.151 At this point, Asian labor-sending countries designed a formal system
with GCC labor-receiving governments; Asian labor forces “became a major export item” to
GCC countries.152 Thus, former labor-exporting states, including Egypt and Tunisia, were left
with exacerbated unemployment problems, which fueled protests in these nations.153 As Hussain
and Howard note, “access to jobs may have been a primary source of discontent in Arab Spring
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countries, particularly in countries… where the formal unemployment rates topped 15 percent…
countries with weak protest had low unemployment rates.”154
Labor-related protests in Egypt are therefore hardly surprising in the 2005-2012 time
period. Labor protests in Egypt had reached a level of “normalization” in the mid-2000s:
“Between 2004 and 2008, more than 1.7 million [Egyptian] workers participated in contentious
collective actions” that were ignored or met with no consequences.155 Unlike in the GCC,
organized labor unions are legal in Egypt, and thus collective action by workers is not punished
to the degree that it is in the GCC; in fact, such labor-related protests in Egypt are expected.156
Additionally, at this particular historical moment, unskilled labor from the poorer, less developed
MENA countries that was formerly exported to the GCC nations to work on oil and construction
projects was supplanted by Asian migrant workers under the kafala system; these laborers are
easier to manipulate due to linguistic and cultural barriers, and have less regional mobility than
Arab migrants from within the MENA states, thus helping to explain the GCC’s general
preference for non-Arab migrant labor.157 This shift in labor preferences helps to explain the
timing and location of the Arab Spring uprisings; unemployment alone, without consideration of
the underlying labor force demographics and the kafala system that explain unemployment
figures, does not wield adequate explanatory power.
Unemployment figures for several MENA nations that experienced unrest and/or regime
collapse during the Arab Spring contrast with those of the GCC nations:158
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Unemployment Rates by Country

Unemployment Rate (%)

14%
12%
Unemployment Rate
2005-09

10%
8%

Unemployment Rate
2010-14

6%
4%
2%
0%

Country

Source: World Bank, Unemployment (as % of labor force)

Without employment opportunities within their respective countries or in the nations that
formerly employed Arab migrants, anti-government protesters in these MENA nations demanded
reforms; in particular, youth (especially young men) and young adult populations in these
countries that are now “more educated and less employed” than earlier generations took to the
streets in the hopes of achieving liberalization and upward social mobility.159 Ironically,
however, previous attempts at economic liberalization in both Egypt and Tunisia “created a new
class of super-wealthy entrepreneurs,” as opposed to more equal societies with increased
opportunities on the whole.160
Among the Gulf nations, only Saudi Arabia’s unemployment rate increased over the
period of the Arab Spring (by 0.8%); all other GCC countries’ unemployment rates remained
constant or decreased over this period. In order to attract and maintain such sizable migrant labor
populations, GCC nations must have major industry – oil and construction are key examples.
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Low domestic unemployment coupled with a major industry (e.g. oil or massive construction
projects) that attracts these workers to a guaranteed job with promised income explains the
overwhelming presence of migrant labor in these countries.161 Low domestic unemployment
further aids in illustrating why political unrest did not spread throughout the GCC because salient
political actors in these countries – citizens/nationals – are less likely to protest a status quo that
is financially rewarding. A combination of economic preconditions – low domestic
unemployment and industry that requires cheap, unskilled labor forces – is a mechanism that
explains why and how the GCC countries created and sustained such labor force demographics,
and in turn how these demographics contributed to the overall stability and regime staying power
of GCC countries relative to the non-GCC MENA nations that experienced massive protests and
unrest during the Arab Spring.
The sheer number of non-Arab migrant workers in the GCC nations is difficult to
measure accurately, but estimates of the total populations of these workers in the Gulf suggest
the staggering impact they have on the labor forces in these countries. The table below, adapted
from Baldwin-Edwards, approximates foreign migrant worker populations in the GCC
countries:162

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161
162

"Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force)," The World Bank.
Baldwin-Edwards, Labour Immigration and Labour Markets, 9.

Stern 53

While these numbers may overestimate workers in the kafala system in these countries – these
estimates may include skilled foreign workers who do not participate in construction or oil
sectors – this data is still useful to approximate the sheer volume of migrant labor in the GCC.
Clearly, the GCC nations have attracted sizable foreign, mostly Asian, migrant labor populations
to conduct “the more unappealing kinds of labor on which any society depends” and on which
oil-rich nations heavily rely,163 and have all maintained relatively low or negligible levels of
unemployment throughout and since the Arab Spring.164 It is worthwhile to note that no parallel
migrant labor force exists in other MENA countries, including Libya, which is considered by the
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CIA to be among the top ten oil producing nations in the world.165 The Migrant Rights Research
Centre (MRRC), an organization devoted to “advancing the rights of migrant workers throughout
the Middle East,” does not report on any non-Arab migrant labor populations in countries such as
Libya, Egypt or Tunisia.166 MRRC profiles labor-sending and labor-receiving countries in this
region; one of its only mentions of Egypt is as a labor-sending nation to Kuwait (in the late
1970s),167 and another cites Egypt as a destination for refugees from Gaza.168 In various reports
on Asian migrant populations in MENA, only the GCC countries are mentioned as destinations.
A corollary to this causal mechanism is the importance of fiscal preconditions. Several
scholars agree that particular economic conditions, especially high levels of unemployment,
contributed to the onset of anti-government protests and conflicts during the Arab Spring.
Tracing how labor markets as a proxy of economic conditions vary across the region is thus a
useful mode of understanding how and why political unrest did not overwhelm the GCC.169
According to World Bank data, all of the GCC countries are considered high-income non-OECD
nations:170
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Country

GDP (as of 2012-13)

Population

Bahrain

$32.79 billion

1.332 million

Kuwait

$183.2 billion

3.369 million

Oman

$80.57 billion

3.632 million

Qatar

$202.5 billion

2.169 million

Saudi Arabia

$745.3 billion

28.83 million

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

$383.8 billion

9.346 million

Source: World Bank, High Income Non-OECD Country Profiles

Gulf countries have a certain set of fundamental economic preconditions, including high
levels of income, that create a sense of stability that attracts migrant workers to these countries as
opposed to other resource-wealthy nations. For comparison, Libya is an oil-rich nation but is
considered “developing” and is characterized by the World Bank as “upper-middle income.”171
Together with political climate, high levels of per capita income lead migrant laborers to believe
in possibilities of obtaining wealth in these nations, however misplaced their aspirations are due
to the gap between what workers are promised and the realities of migrant labor conditions in the
GCC nations.172
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Chapter V: Three Cases
The case studies in this thesis have been selected for their important variation on key
independent and dependent variables of interest. First, the case of Libya will be reviewed to
highlight the shortcomings of the existing hypotheses that purport to explain the Arab Spring.
Then, the experience of Bahrain will be reviewed and analyzed in anticipation of potential
criticism of the hypothesis proposed in this thesis; despite its membership to the GCC, Bahrain’s
major protests, it will be shown, do not undermine the labor force demographics argument
presented here. Finally, the case of Qatar is outlined as a “positive” example that powerfully
illustrates the importance of labor force demographics in understanding variation in the Arab
Spring uprisings.

The Failure of Existing Hypotheses: The Case of Libya
The collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime in Libya calls several existing
hypotheses that aim to explain the Arab Spring into question. Specifically, Libya’s oil wealth and
Gaddafi’s apparent selection of his son, Seif al-Islam, to succeed him as heir to the Libyan
government speak to the inadequacy of the oil and hereditary succession hypotheses,
respectively.
In power for over four decades, Muammar Gaddafi created a regime that deprived
Libyans of “all freedom of expression, political debate and normal civil society. The cult of
Gaddafi went much deeper than that of any other Arab dictator.”173 Muammar Gaddafi rose to
power in Libya by military coup that ousted the Libyan King Idris in September 1969.174 Gaddafi
became an absolute ruler, consolidating his control over civilian government and the Libyan
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military, adopting the title of Colonel.175 In his infamous Green Book, Gaddafi spelled out his
opposition to the idea of democratic government; he rejected “all forms of representation” in an
attempt to shore up his authoritarian rule and to legitimize his tyrannical use of power.176
Over the course of one week in February 2011, protests that began in Benghazi infected
major cities across Libya; by February 20, 2011, anti-government rebels had seized control of
Benghazi and were threatening to topple the Gaddafi regime. Not only were protests in Libya
ignited by events in Egypt and Tunisia, but the arrest of a lawyer who had “represent[ed] the
relatives of prisoners killed in the 1996 [Abu Salim] prison massacre”177 – an attempted prison
break that resulted over a thousand inmates’ deaths by armed guards – actually accelerated
Libya’s protest movement.178 One month later, NATO forces began a targeted intervention in
Libya, and in October 2011, Gaddafi was captured and killed in Sirte.179
As the events of the Arab Spring illustrate, Gaddafi’s regime was anything but invincible.
Gaddafi had created “one of the most repressive regimes in the Arab world,” but failed to
withstand the force of popular protests.180 The implosion of Gaddafi’s totalitarian rule calls the
oil and succession hypotheses for explaining regional variation during the Arab Spring into
question because Libya, like GCC nations, had both oil wealth and a regime based on autocratic
hereditary rule, but experienced massive unrest and eventual collapse.
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Libya is an oil-rich nation, ranked among the top ten oil producing countries in the
world.181 Thus, the argument that oil wealth indicated stability and relative safety from massive
protest and overthrow during the Arab Spring is, at best, an oversimplification. Gaddafi failed to
utilize his country’s oil wealth in ways that “provid[ed] social services, and direct[ed] the
development of dependent private sectors.”182 This was perhaps due to Gaddafi’s personalistic
use of his country’s oil money, wealth that he claimed as his “personal fortune.”183 In fact, the
Libyan people were generally impoverished despite their country’s sources of massive wealth:
“Oil sustained [Gaddafi’s] madness” to the detriment of his people.184
Additionally, Libya never attracted a sizable (or notable) migrant worker population from
the Asian labor-sending states; the overall absence of non-Arab migrant workers in Libya
illustrates the country’s instability, despite its wealth and the potential for there to be sectors
seeking to employ cheap migrant labor. First, no such opportunities existed because, unlike in
the GCC, oil wealth in Libya was not utilized to develop other industrial complexes, such as
construction. Gaddafi mismanaged the oil sector in order to “use the country as a grand
laboratory, frittering away cash as each hare-brained experiment took his fancy.”185 Second, the
haphazard nature of Libya’s oil economy and resource wealth abuse by Gaddafi and his
immediate cronies likely made it rather difficult for the Libyan government to create any
bilateral agreements with labor-sending countries in Asia; these agreements sustain the kafala
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system in the GCC and thus supply the Gulf with its migrant workforce.186 Gaddafi’s reputation
as an international pariah probably made such “diplomatic” agreements extremely unlikely to
achieve and to sustain.187
On the topic of hereditary succession, Gaddafi’s sons were long thought to be groomed to
succeed their father.188 Gaddafi had selected his son, Seif al-Islam, as his heir to perpetuate the
regime,189 and there was no meaningful or apparent alternative to the entrenched power structure
that Gaddafi created after his military coup.190 Despite Seif al-Islam’s public “rejection” of his
role as heir to his father’s regime, he was his father’s political right hand, “act[ing] as his father’s
official spokesman”191 and aiding Muammar Gaddafi “in the brutal suppression of Libya’s
uprising.”192 While Libya degenerated into civil conflict, Seif al-Islam “vow[ed] to continue the
war and retake his father’s capital [from rebel forces].”193 His actions as a political and
diplomatic figure in Libya, and his assertions of power that have recently resulted in his
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indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, cast doubt on whether he really
would have refused the position for which his father was preparing him.194
As the case of Libya illustrates, the theory of hereditary succession as a determinant of
regime stability in the context of the Arab Spring does not withstand close scrutiny. After
protests in Tunisia and Egypt unseated authoritarian regimes, Libyan protesters similarly
organized against their government and ended – rather mercilessly – the Gaddafi rule.195 The
case of Libya highlights that this hypothesis fails to explain why some hereditary regimes
survived while others succumbed to protests and unrest.

Bahrain: Exception to the Rule?
Unlike the other GCC nations, Bahrain experienced anti-regime protest that may have
threatened the country’s political status quo during the Arab Spring. The Saudi Arabian military
responded to and put down these protests, and the Bahraini king ultimately remained in power.196
The most notable of these protests occurred on February 16-17, 2011 at the Pearl Roundabout in
Manama, the capital city of the small island nation of Bahrain, a short distance from the large
and powerful country of Saudi Arabia.197 The nature of this protest against the Al Khalifa ruling
family deserves further attention due to the particularities of the nation of Bahrain.
While this instance may be read as an exception that undermines the hypothesis presented
in this thesis, Bahrain is a much more nuanced case that does not fundamentally challenge the
labor force demographics hypothesis. First, Bahrain, unlike the other five GCC countries, does
not employ the kafala system; this means that migrant laborers in Bahrain are arguably more free
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and thus have fewer reasons to protest than their counterparts in GCC countries with the
oppressive kafala system.198 In 2008-2009, Bahrain became the only GCC country to repeal the
kafala system of sponsorship and allow migrant workers to change employers or to resign once
they arrived in Bahrain.199 Bahrain adopted this liberalized policy in order to “place a ceiling on
the number of expatriate workers in Bahrain;” clearly, no other GCC country has much interest
in limiting its supply of cheap migrant labor.200 By extension, this means that the demonstration
effect was weaker (or nonexistent) in Bahrain than in other GCC countries where strikes by
migrant laborers were consistently struck down with force. Additionally, Bahrain has a more
diversified economy than other Gulf nations, and relies less on migrant labor than other GCC
countries whose economies are built on oil and construction industries.201
On a related note, protesters in Bahrain did not necessarily demand the end or total
destruction of the ruling regime. As Matthiesen notes, demands were more moderate than those
in the protests exploding in Egypt and Tunisia; in Bahrain, protesters took “the slogan that had
galvanized protesters in Cairo and Tunis (‘The people want the fall of the regime’) but
substitut[ed] islah (reform) for isqat (fall).”202 While these protests are still noteworthy, they
were neither as violent nor as extreme in their demands as those in non-GCC nations. It is
apparent that the demands of the mostly-Shia protesters in Bahrain were generally more
moderate than those of protesters in Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya because the Shia population in
Bahrain had a core cluster of concerns that affected their livelihood – for example, more equal
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housing and job opportunities and an end to favoritism of the Sunni minority.203 Although
protesters in Bahrain did, in some cases, make more extreme demands – such as the dissolution
of the 2002 constitution – Bahraini protesters’ generally moderate demands are likely the result
of their relative contentedness with their status quo versus the lived realities of their counterparts
in non-GCC countries.
That demands for reform in Bahrain were more moderate may reflect that protesters in
Bahrain realized the impossibility of achieving larger change; the risk of protest, especially by
the disenchanted Shia majority, was clear, but not enough to deter mass movement by a religious
majority ruled by a minority altogether. The overall genesis of the protests in Bahrain suggests
that Bahrain was a categorically different case than the non-GCC MENA countries where mass
movements were more successful.204
Another aspect of the case of Bahrain that is worth noting is that Sunnis control the
government, but the majority of the country is Shia.205 The sectarian nature of the protests in
Bahrain further distinguish them from demonstrations in non-GCC nations. The conflict between
the ruling Sunni minority and the Shia majority that view “themselves as indigenous Bahrainis”
is significant to explaining the specific circumstances of the protests in Bahrain.206 Religious
disagreement between the citizenry and the government was thus another reason for uprisings
that occurred in Bahrain but not elsewhere in the GCC. The majority of the populations in GCC
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countries is Sunni, but of the 2 million Shia in the GCC, most live in Bahrain.207 The following
table depicts the distribution of the Shia population in the GCC:
Country

Percentage of Population Identifying as Shia

Bahrain

60-70

Kuwait

20-30

Oman

<5

Qatar

10

Saudi Arabia

10-15

UAE

10-15

Source: Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 3.
Tensions between Sunni and Shia Bahrainis have run high in the small country for decades,208
and stem from many centuries of conflict over religious practices and the resentment of the ruled
toward the ruling family.209 The Arab Spring in Bahrain involved “Shia protesters…
demand[ing] job opportunities and democratic changes in government… the police attacked
these demonstrators with tear gas and rubber bullets.”210 When this mode of protest suppression
did not work, Bahrain welcomed thousands of Saudi troops onto the island to quell the
demonstrations.211
The sense of cultural and religious “otherness” that separated the majority of Bahraini
citizens from their government thus made repression of protests by Bahraini and Saudi military
forces easier; the “military’s willingness to shoot on civilians, facilitated by the ‘otherness’ of the
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protesters (mostly Shia in contrast to the Sunni ruling family and military elite) and reinforced by
Saudi military support, constituted the major difference between this case and that of the first
comers, Tunisia and Egypt.”212 Thus, despite Bahrain’s migrant labor population, its internal
politics and religious turmoil between the ruled Shia majority and the ruling Sunni minority
made it uniquely poised to become infected with the contagion of the Arab Spring. The Bahraini
regime was threatened, but not overthrown, by popular protest. The particularities of this case,
therefore, cannot completely undermine the labor force demographics hypothesis.

Qatar: A Positive Case
A small yet incredibly powerful GCC nation, Qatar’s experience of the Arab Spring was
a complex one. Qatar is consistently ranked the richest nation in the world per capita, surpassing
geopolitical giants such as the US, the EU, and China.213 It is estimated that approximately 90%
of Qatar’s labor force is made up of non-national migrant workers, most of whom are from
Asia.214 Qatar’s booming oil economy, paired with its massive construction sector – at the heart
of which are current projects for the 2022 FIFA World Cup – attract and sustain such a huge
migrant labor force.215 Qatar is a useful example to illustrate how the labor force demographics
hypothesis operated in Gulf nations during the Arab Spring, and how this particular element
influenced variation in anti-government protests at this historical moment.
Qatar employs the kafala system and enforces it ruthlessly: in Qatar, employers
“routine[ly] confiscat[e]… [migrant] worker’s passports” and wield “inordinate control over
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their employees.”216 The poor working and living conditions that migrant workers in Qatar face
lead them to protest frequently; there are laws against unionization and striking in Qatar, like in
other GCC nations, so the punishment for public demonstrations is severe.217 Migrant workers
who strike are jailed, deported, or face violence.218 These policies and consequences for mass
protest effectively deterred Qatari nationals from engaging in demonstrations themselves; the
costs were too high and the benefits too uncertain to participate in such behavior.
In Qatar, Asian migrant workers had been striking for years before the Arab Spring
occurred. In 2006, “over 2,000 workers… struck… and protested at their labor camp in Qatar
demanding an increase in salary.”219 Such behavior has resulted in jail and deportation of
migrant workers who participate in these protests. The consequences of protests effectively
deterred future protests by Qatari nationals.
It could be argued that since migrant workers are not citizens of Qatar and lack any
political capital to meaningfully challenge the Qatari regime, the consequences of their behavior
would not influence the willingness of Qatari nationals to protest themselves; the punishment for
the same behavior by migrant workers and citizens would likely be different. However, any
behavior interpreted to be anti-regime in Qatar, regardless of who performs the action, is subject
to a jail sentence. In the context of the Arab Spring, Qatari poet Mohamed Rashid al-Ajami was
given a life sentence for writing a poem that “[spread] incendiary material” that challenged the
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regime.220 If this was the consequence for writing a poem, the punishment for public
demonstration would assumedly only be more severe.
There is evidence that such revolutionary spirit existed among the people of Qatar during
the Arab Spring, but that they were effectively deterred from taking to the streets. In February
2011, a Facebook page called “The Freedom Revolution” was created to “[call] for a revolution
against the regime of Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Aal Thani. Its organizers [were]
protesting against the corruption rampant in the regime and the absence of real political and party
life in Qatar.”221 This particular page received thousands of likes, and other similar pages also
gained followings.222 However, no such revolution ever materialized in Qatar, no protest or mass
mobilization took place, and the regime remained intact and unchallenged.
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Chapter VI: Conclusions and Implications
The puzzle that this thesis has aimed to address is why the Arab Spring uprisings
unevenly affected the MENA region. Much of the existing scholarship is preoccupied with the
question of why the Arab Spring occurred in the first place, as opposed to why and where
uprisings either never took root or why, in some cases, they failed so miserably. One of the goals
of this thesis is to fill this identified analytical gap.
The proposed answer to this question that this thesis puts forth is that labor market
demographics in the six Gulf Cooperation Council nations usefully explain why these countries
experienced little or no mass protest movement during the Arab Spring. Existing hypotheses that
posit the significance of hereditary authoritarianism, the role of social media, diversity, and oil
wealth in explaining variation during the Arab Spring protests fail to capture the entire story.
Hereditary authoritarian governments and reliance on oil wealth characterized MENA nations
that succumbed to Arab Spring protests (e.g. Libya) and unaffected countries (e.g. Qatar and the
UAE) alike, and therefore do not explain the absence of protest in much of the GCC. This is not
to say that oil wealth is unimportant, but that it does not explain variation in the Arab Spring
uprisings in the ways currently argued. Oil wealth was used to “buy off” potentially discontented
populations in Libya and the GCC, and therefore the use of natural resource wealth to buy
loyalty cannot explain the Arab Spring uprisings.223 Additionally, social media cannot explain
variation by itself; social media and internet usage penetrated much more of the GCC nations’
populations than countries such as Egypt or Libya, where uprisings overthrew regimes.224 The
diversity argument is similarly unsatisfactory; political, cultural, socioeconomic and religious
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diversity exist across the region, but the Arab Spring only manifested as protests in a select few
countries. In fact, some of the more diverse nations in the MENA region, such as Lebanon,
avoided the Arab Spring entirely. While no single explanation is perfect, these hypotheses miss
crucial elements of the cross-regional variation in protest occurrence and success during the Arab
Spring.
This thesis hypothesizes that labor market demographics meaningfully and usefully
differentiate between countries that did or did not experience protest during the Arab Spring, and
can explain the absence of protest in almost all of the GCC countries. According to this
hypothesis, the presence of non-Arab, Asian migrant worker populations in the GCC countries in
huge numbers helps to explain variation in protests across the MENA region during the Arab
Spring for at least two reasons. First, these migrant labor populations in the GCC protest and
strike frequently; this behavior is met with violent and harsh consequences. By way of
demonstration effect, the punishments suffered by migrant workers for protesting deterred GCC
citizens from protesting themselves. As Facebook pages and social media campaigns calling for
“revolution” in these countries show, the inclination to protest GCC governments existed,225 but
GCC nationals did not, with the exception of Bahrain, take to the streets in attempts to overthrow
their respective governments. GDELT data on protest occurrence in these countries supports the
contention that labor protests and strikes by migrant workers served to deter GCC citizens from
protesting themselves. The cost for GCC citizens to protest their governments was too high, and
would not outweigh the potential benefits; for migrant laborers who are completely socially,
politically and economically disempowered in these contexts, the costs of protesting are
calculated to be more favorable than their status quo.
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Second, the presence of Asian migrant labor in the GCC in such huge numbers – in every
GCC country, Asian migrant workers make up 50% or more of the labor force – has meant that
intraregional migration for jobs in the GCC has slowed or stopped.226 GCC nations historically
hired unskilled labor from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and the other poorer MENA countries, but have
recently shown preference for Asian migrant labor for a number of reasons; Asian migrant
workers are thought to pose less of a political threat to GCC countries, and are more easily
coerced and controlled due to linguistic and cultural barriers.227 This shift in labor preferences
left thousands unemployed in former MENA labor-sending countries, and helps to explain why
protests occurred in those countries but not in most GCC nations. Thus, there is an important
difference between what this thesis offers as a causal mechanism and what the existing literature
posits is significant about unemployment and fiscal indicators in explaining the Arab Spring;
unemployment existed in non-GCC MENA countries at this particular historical moment due to
the shift in the Gulf’s labor preferences from intraregional unskilled labor to Asian migrant
workers. The kafala system and the labor it supplies to sustain major industries are thus at least
somewhat responsible for the GCC’s high-income status. Thus, labor force demographics help to
explain why Gulf citizens were relatively more content with their status quo compared to their
non-GCC counterparts, why they had fewer reasons to mobilize, and why regimes in the GCC
remained virtually undisturbed by the Arab Spring.
The case studies presented in this thesis highlight variation in independent variables of
interest. The case of Libya is significant because, as an oil-rich, non-GCC nation that
experienced massive unrest, Libya’s lack of a sizable Asian migrant labor force helps to explain
protests and regime collapse. Libya shared important explanatory variables with the GCC
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countries – a hereditary authoritarian mode of government and oil resources – but lacked a
sizable migrant labor force and thus the demonstration effect that accompanies migrant labor
protests.
Additionally, Bahrain is an important case because, as a GCC nation that experienced
massive protests in which the Saudi Arabian military intervened on behalf of the Bahraini
regime, it could be argued that the case of Bahrain undermines the labor force demographics
hypothesis as the case of Libya undermines existing alternative hypotheses. However, Bahrain
differs from the other GCC nations in two very important respects: it does not employ the kafala
system, and its Shia majority is governed by a Sunni minority. Since Bahrain does not use the
kafala system to recruit and coercively retain migrant laborers, Asian migrant workers in Bahrain
are relatively more free to unionize and move around between employers than their counterparts
in other GCC nations, and thus would be less likely to protest than migrant workers in other
GCC nations that ruthlessly employ and enforce the kafala system.228 This, in turn, weakens the
demonstration effect that migrant worker protests would have had on citizens’ inclinations to
mobilize. Second, the Shia/Sunni tensions in Bahrain separate it from the other GCC nations,
where the majority of both citizens and rulers are Sunni. Religious and cultural clashes in
Bahrain made it particularly ripe for protest; these protests failed largely because the government
and the coercive apparatus in Bahrain regarded the protesters as “others” and thus it was easier
for the regime to crack down harshly against its people.229
Finally, the case of Qatar is presented to show how the labor market demographics
hypothesis operated in a GCC nation. In Qatar, as made clear by Facebook activity, people had
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the inclination to protest but never actually took to the streets against the Qatari government.230
This can be explained by the consequences suffered by migrant laborers in Qatar who protested
for better wages and working conditions; Qatari citizens realized that the cost of protesting
would be outweighed by any potential benefits, especially because many people in Qatar derive
major advantages from a consistent supply of cheap migrant labor.
There are several implications of this research. First, protest diffusion is a complex,
multivariable phenomenon. Political and cultural similarities between neighboring countries are
not sufficient to predict that protest will diffuse across nations; contagion requires more than
geographic proximity and baseline sociopolitical commonalities. The idea that “a wave of mass
mobilization swept the broader Middle East, toppled dictators, and cleared the way for
democracy” has not been and likely will not be borne out.231 The failure of the Arab Spring
uprisings to result in democracy across the MENA region is not simply a lack of mobilization,
but a consequence of entrenched economic practices, including the exploitation of migrant labor
forces and intolerance of protest that accompanies the presence of these populations. Stemming
the tide of contagion via the demonstration effect and the use of preemptive crackdowns is
important to consider when studying the potential for protests to take hold cross-regionally.
A second and perhaps more significant implication of this research is that labor markets
and their compositions have important political consequences. In the case of the GCC, labor
force demographics helped to deter citizens from protesting against their respective
governments; in addition to preemptive anti-protest measures and existing statutes intolerant of
popular demonstrations, the presence of Asian migrant worker populations in the GCC
effectively helped these nations avoid destabilizing mass mobilization. Labor force
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demographics alter population compositions and intra-national relations, and in turn have
significant consequences for political behavior.
The way forward for the MENA region is, at best, unclear. As cross-regional variation
during the Arab Spring illustrates, the disappearance of authoritarian governments and in turn,
transitions to democracy, no longer seem so assured. A sustained shift away from Asian migrant
labor exploitation is doubtful; international talks on improving the human rights of these migrant
laborers in the GCC have not yet resulted in any meaningful changes, and it does not appear that
they will in the future.232 If the GCC’s reliance on exploited migrant labor persists, the cycle of
demonstration effect and protest intolerance will likely continue unabated, and thus challenges to
the GCC regimes from below seem unlikely in the foreseeable future. It appears as though
Huntington’s waves of democracy no longer crash as loudly or unfailingly; the tide seems to be
going out.233
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Appendix – GDELT Data
Labor-Related Protests in the GCC, 2005-2012
Year
2005
2006
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Year
2007
2008
2009
2011
2012

Country Name
Kuwait
UAE
UAE
Bahrain
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Bahrain
Kuwait
UAE
Bahrain
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Bahrain
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Saudi Arabia

Number of
Protests
1
4
3
2
1
1
4
14
7
4
2
4
5
2
4
1
2
2
8
3
10
6
5
6
7
1
14

Ant-Government Protests in the GCC, 2005-2012
Country Name
Number of Protests
Saudi Arabia
1
Saudi Arabia
2
UAE
1
Bahrain
1
Bahrain
7
Saudi Arabia
1

Labor Protests in Egypt and Libya, 2005-2012
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Country Name
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Libya
Egypt
Libya

Number of Protests
4
4
6
7
10
176
17
42
9

Anti-Government Protests in Egypt and Libya, 2005-2012
Year
2009
2011
2012

Country Name
Egypt
Egypt
Libya
Egypt
Libya

Number of Protests
4
52
17
6
1
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